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ABSTRACT:  Revisiting Lacan’s discussion of the puzzle of the prisoner’s 
dilemma provides a means of elaborating a theory of the trans-subjective. An 
illustration of this dilemma provides the basis for two important arguments. 
Firstly, that we need to grasp a logical succession of modes of subjectivity: 
from subjectivity to inter-subjectivity, and from inter-subjectivity to a form of 
trans-subjective social logic. The trans-subjective, thus conceptualized, enables 
forms of social objectivity that transcend the level of (inter)subjectivity, and 
which play a crucial role in consolidating given societal groupings. The paper 
advances, secondly, that various declarative and symbolic activities are 
important non-psychological bases – trans-subjective foundations - for 
psychological identifications of an inter-subjective sort. These assertions link 
interesting to recent developments in the contemporary social psychology of 
interobjectivity, which likewise emphasize a type of objectivity that plays an 
indispensible part in co-ordinating human relations and understanding. 
 




Towards a Lacanian group psychology: The prisoner’s 
dilemma and the trans-subjective 
 
This paper explores the well-known logical puzzle of the prisoner’s dilemma 
and does so via the work of Jacques Lacan (2006b), who utilizes it as a means 
of grounding what we might term a theory of the trans-subjective. My hope in 
this respect is to make a contribution to a series of recent developments in the 
contemporary social psychology of interobjectivity, and to do so by means of 
the ‘extra-disciplinary’ source of psychoanalytic theory. More specifically, I 
would like to use the prisoner’s dilemma, and Lacan’s associated 3-fold schema 
of logical time, to make two general arguments. I want to assert, firstly, that 
we need to grasp a logical succession of modes of subjectivity - from 
subjectivity to inter-subjectivity, and from inter-subjectivity to a form of trans-
subjective social logic - if we are to understand the subject-to-society relation. 
This sequence of modalities of subjectivity and, more particularly, the 
distinction between the inter-subjective and the trans-subjective, will be crucial 
in appreciating the difference between what are sometimes referred to as 
symbolic and imaginary forms of identification (Lacan, 1988a, 1988b; Žižek, 
1996).  
My second key objective in the paper is to advance that various 
declarative, institutional and symbolic activities are important non-
psychological bases for imaginary (or what we might loosely call 
‘psychological’) identifications. In other words, I am making an argument about 
the importance of certain symbolic constituents as conditions of possibility for 
the existence of psychological identifications. This second objective links back 
to the first, inasmuch as symbolic identifications always entail the dimension of 
the trans-subjective, whereas what I am calling imaginary identifications do 
not. Importantly, although Lacan himself does not utilize the term ‘trans-
subjective’ - the imposition of this term is my own - I maintain that it remains 
faithful to a reading of his early work, and that it provides a means of linking 




Intersubjectivity, interobjectivity and trans-subjectivity 
We may start our discussion by asking a straightforward question: why the 
need to develop an understanding of the trans-subjective? Surely, given the 
sophistication of recent work on the topic of intersubjectivity, this concept 
should itself suffice? Within the field of social psychology Gillespie & Cornish 
(2009) have for example illuminated the concept from the perspective of 
dialogical analysis. Gillespie & Richardson (2011), similarly, have explored the 
topic via discussions of position exchange, perspective taking and actor-
observer communication. Coelho & Figueiredo (2003), furthermore, have 
brought philosophical and psychoanalytic insights to bear in their 
categorization of four basic forms of intersubjectivity, each of which is based 
on a matrix of organizing and elucidating otherness. They distinguish a 
phenomenological type of intersubjectivity from traumatic, interpersonal and 
intrapsychic forms (Coelho & Figueiredo, 2003). 
As perspicacious as each of the above analytical engagements have 
been, I follow Moghaddam (1997, 2003) in arguing that there are important 
limitations characterizing the literature on intersubjectvity. The first of these 
shortcomings, for Moghaddam (1997), is disciplinary insularity. He accordingly 
calls for greater bridge-building between different scholarly perspectives 
(social psychologists, theoreticians, developmental psychologists), in order to 
advance a broader cross-theoretical exploration of the underlying foundations 
of intersubjectivity. Moghaddam also (2003) advances the charge of 
reductionism: studies of intersubjectivity remain typically focussed on 
individualistic rather than inter-group processes, leading us to examine inter-
personal and intra-personal experiences at the cost of collective ones. The 
result of this is that political relations and inequalities of power are elided in 
such analyses. While I concur with Moghaddam’s (2003) views, proposing to 
offer a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective to expanded theoretical field he 
asks for, I also add a further element of critique. That is to say: perspectives on 
intersubjectivity often lack an adequate examination of the logical relations 
and symbolic structures underlying such interactions. They may be considered 
reductionist in this sense also. 
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 Like Moghaddam (2003) then, I am concerned with a broader (and in my 
case, structural and symbolic) domain that underlies and potentially delimits 
the field of intersubjectivity. Moghaddam offers the concept of interobjectivity 
as a means of correcting the “reductionist, individualist biases in traditional 
research arising out of western culture” (p. 221). By interobjectivity he has in 
mind “the understandings that are shared within and between cultures about 
social reality” (p. 221). Given the foregoing contextualization, it is perhaps 
clearer why I emphasized so strongly the notion of the trans-subjective in 
sketching out my proposed arguments in this paper. It is via this notion that I 
wish to signal a direction of analysis that both exceeds, and yet remains linked 
to, analyses of the intersubjective; and it is through this notion that that I make 
my contribution to how we think interobjectvity.  
The concepts of interobjectivity and the trans-subjective overlap 
significantly. Interobjectivity has been defined as an account of shared 
meanings that structure interactions between subjects through objects 
(Sammut, Daanen & Sartawi, 2010). In this respect, trans-subjectivity would 
indeed be one form of interobjectivity, provided that we understand the object 
in question as type a kind of ‘social objectivity’ rather than an object per se. 
This qualification is present in the distinction that Sammut, Daanen & Sartawi 
(2010) draw between: a) inter-objectivity as a description of material object-
relations, and b) interobjectivity as a description of a representation that spans 
different objectifications and enables diverse inter-objective relations (p. 451). 
It is the second of these definitions that has the most in common with what I 
am calling trans-subjectivity. In this respect it is worth stressing Moghaddam’s 
(2003, 2006) gloss on interobjectivity as an account of the nature of shared 
meanings for people that represents a return to ‘objectivity’. This approach 
likewise shares much with the idea of the trans-subjective. 
 A few additional qualifications are in order here, so as to contextualize 
the ‘extra-disciplinary’ contribution that I hope to make to social psychological 
theory. For a start, the variant of the prisoner’s dilemma that I draw on, 
following Lacan, is not – as readers will soon become aware – the version most 
familiar to students of game theory (i.e. that of two prisoners each involved in 
a strategic plea-bargain attempt in which they make a strategic decision as to 
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whether they betray the other prisoner, remain silent, attempt a type of 
cooperation) (see for example Marks (2004)). Likewise significant is the fact 
that the topic of identification as posed here differs notably from the notion of 
‘identity’ that a social psychology audience would be more familiar with. It 
helps here to add a brief definition of identification as understood in the 
psychoanalytic literature as that largely unconscious process “whereby the 
subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the other and is 
transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides (Laplanche 
& Pontalis, 1978, p. 206). With imaginary identifications we are primarily 
concerned with the domain of interpersonal ego-other (or psychological) 
identifications, with how subjects take on ‘images’ from the external world 
that provide the basis for the formation of an ego (Lacan, 2006a). There is an 
idealizing and narcissistic quality to such imaginary schemas which prioritizes 
visual markers of difference and/or similarity. The imaginary register of 
identification should be differentiated from that of the symbolic, which is best 
grasped via anthropology’s emphasis on social convention and the codification 
of social relations (bonds, exchanges, kinship structures) that structure 
experience. The symbolic order is  the ‘extra-psychological’ realm of 
differential systems, language, law, prohibition. It is an a-subjective social grid 
in which subjects must necessarily assume a position, a role, a place which, 
despite the ego’s imaginary reassurances, is never merely spontaneous, 
‘natural’. 
 One further point of qualification. The treatment of inter-subjectivity 
and trans-subjectivity I develop may seem to supersede issues of everyday 
expected psychological reactions by prioritizing the role of logical relations and 
rational agents. Let me concede as much: I am not directly addressing the most 
obvious psychological aspects of behaviour in the prisoner’s dilemma. My 
discussion focuses on the element of what we might call trans-subjective 
objectivity, i.e. a domain that transcends the merely (inter)subjective. Let us 
turn now to Lacan’s variant of the prisoner’s dilemma. 
Three times of subjectivity 
It is necessary now to briefly replay the puzzle of the prisoner’s dilemma (for 
other psychoanalytic discussions of the dilemma see Fink, 1996; Johnston, 
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2005). Place yourself in the following position: you are one of three prisoners 
who have been given the opportunity of wining their freedom, provided that 
you are able to give the correct response to a simple question, namely “What 
is the disk that has been affixed to your clothing?” You of course cannot see 
the colour of the disk, and each of the other two prisoners facing you is 
likewise unawares of the colour of the disk that has been attached to them. At 
the beginning of the challenge the prison warden outlines a series of basic 
rules. Firstly, only one prisoner will win their freedom in this way, and this will 
be the first prisoner to stand up and correctly tell the warden the colour of the 
disk they are wearing, along with the logical reason underlying their deduction. 
Secondly, no verbal communication is allowed between the prisoners. 
Importantly, the parameters of the game state that there are only two black 
disks and three white; there is thus a limit to the possible combinations of 
disks. 
Here then is the first of the possible scenarios you might be faced with: 
each of the two prisoners facing you has a black disk attached to their clothing. 
Little calculation is required here: if there are only two black disks, and that is 
what you see before you, then you must be wearing a white disk. No 
hypothesis-making is required here, you are presented with none of the inter-
subjective complications of needing to put one’s self into the position of the 
other. Given that there are only two black disks, a single glance is enough to 
confirm that you must be wearing a white disk. All that is required here is a 
rudimentary and instantaneous deduction – no significant period of time needs 
to pass. This is what Lacan refers to as ‘the instance of the glance’. We might 
call this a time of singular subjectivity; no inter-subjective dialectic is involved.  
The second possible situation is more challenging. Of the prisoner before 
you, one is wearing a white disk, the other a black. In contrast to the first 
scenario you will make no headway here unless you make recourse to the 
inter-subjective dialectic of how another sees you. So, following this direction, 
and extending the logic already utilized, you would need to ask yourself: what 
are the other prisoners seeing? More particularly, you would need to ask 
yourself what the prisoner with the white disk sees. Why is it so important to 
imagine white the white disk prisoner is seeing? Well, if he were to see two 
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black disks before him he would stand up and leave, having arrived at the 
conclusion that he must be white (because there can only be two black disks). 
If the white disk prisoner does not stand up to leave, it can only be because 
you are wearing a white disk rather than a black. Clearly, a form of inter-
subjectivity is involved here; the subject needs to reason from the place of the 
other. It is also necessary that a certain time elapse here; this is not an 
instantaneous moment of recognition but rather what Lacan refers to as ‘the 
time of understanding’, which varies in length. This is the inter-subjectivity of 
the ‘indefinite reciprocal subject’, a phrase which points to an important 
reliance on the action (or lack thereof) of the other. 
The most difficult variation of the dilemma occurs when the prisoners 
before you are both wearing white disks. Once again, it becomes necessary to 
refer to the reasoning of others. Given that your own disk could be white or 
black, it helps to play out both options. Assuming then for the moment that 
your disk is black, then the other prisoners would each see one black disk, and 
one white. They would each hypothesize that if their own disk were black, then 
one of the remaining prisoners would stand up and leave. This does not 
happen. They conclude that they are wearing a white disk. They would then be 
in a position to stand up and leave – but they don’t. You are thus in a position 
to disconfirm your initial hypothesis: if you were wearing a black disk one of 
your rivals would have left by now – having worked their way through the 
logical steps detailed in the second situation above – therefore you must be 
wearing a white disk. 
The logical reasoning in this third situation requires not merely 
reasoning from the position of a second (the inter-subjectivity of how I imagine 
the other sees me). It requires my hypothesis of what a second subject 
hypothesizes about a third. This is not just a case then of what I think (the 
subjectivity of ‘the instant of the glance’). Nor is it simply a case of the inter-
subjectivity of what is deduced by virtue of how the subject imagines he is 
seen by a second (the ‘time for comprehending’). A threefold structure is in 
operation whereby I imagine myself via the position of a second who makes a 
guess at and responds to a third party. A twofold mediation is at work: who I 
am is not simply mediated by a second, but by what this second hypothesizes 
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about me via a third. Part of what makes this such an anxious experience is 
that my social identity cannot be fixed simply by capturing the perspective of 
one other; I am dependent here on the other’s Other, the precarious 
associative linking of what the generalized other of various others’ perceptions 
seems to amount to. This threefold structure is vital: it is only at this third 
moment of logical time, Lacan’s ‘moment of concluding’, that a type of trans-
subjective social logic is activated. This three-fold structure is required before 
types of social consensus, what we might term an elementary form of ‘social 
objectivity’, becomes possible. The link to the notion of interobjectivity is 
apparent here, certainly so inasmuch I am here concerned with the necessary 
mediation of an external object of sorts, which grounds and orients various 
inter-subjective interactions. The trans-subjective would thus be one form of 
interobjectivity. Crucially of course – and herein lies a key conceptual 
distinction – the object one is most concerned with in speaking of the trans-
subjective is a posited social objectivity with reference to which each 
subjectivity finds its relation to societal norms.  
The disconnect between inter- and trans-subjective 
Two brief examples may help secure the distinction between the inter-
subjective and the trans-subjective. Consider the idea of invented words, 
‘private’ signifiers of special significance, that a given individual or couple may 
utilize as their own code. We remain here at the subjective or intersubjective 
levels, respectively. As functional as such words might be within the 
(inter)subjective exchanges of their ‘private’ usage, they remain separated 
from the properly trans-subjective value of accepted linguistic terms; they 
would not be understood by others who stand outside this (inter)subjective 
frame of reference.  
For all members of a given language community accepted words have a 
conventionalized meaning that cannot be reduced to the personal significance 
they have for any one member. This is not to deny that certain signifiers will 
have a particular resonance for some. For me ‘hook’ is not a noun like any 
other, but is linked to a series of associations with my surname (‘Hook’ as a 
family signifier), i.e. nicknames (‘Right Hook’, ‘Hookster’, ‘Captain Hook’) and 
so on. None of this has any bearing when I go to a hardware store and ask for 
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an implement that will enable me to hang a picture to the wall. Bluntly put: 
communicative use-value necessarily outstrips idiosyncratic nuance. There is 
something tantamount to a shift of paradigm when we move from the 
psychological frame of (inter)subjectivity to the ‘social objectivity’ obtained via 
the use of symbolic and logical processes which entail a type of consensus. One 
brief qualification should be noted here: despite the objectivity of 
conventionalized meaning we are discussing -  namely, that of the signifier to 
which the signified is, in Saussure’s (1974) classic formulation, arbitrarily 
attached - the question of its final meaning is always potentially detoured. 
Detoured, that is, by the question of what this signified meaning may “really 
mean” in view of a set of possible broader implications, for an Other. 
A second example regards the difference between the inter- and trans-
subjective concerns anxiety. Anxiety is a common enough response when one 
is introduced to a group of unfamiliar people. Interestingly, the degree of 
anxiety is often proportionate to the number of people, and the difficulty one 
has in reading their prospective intentions. One way of domesticating this 
anxiety is to gravitate to someone similar to one’s self within the group and 
establish a degree of common ground. Although this person may be a stranger, 
a brief interaction with them will, as per Goffman’s classic analysis (1959), 
provide clues as to who they are, and, more importantly, as to what they might 
think of you. This minimal inter-subjectivity will provide a frame of sorts, that 
is, the elementary co-ordinates of how you are understood within the 
perspective of this other. Now while this situation is conditioned by ongoing 
guesswork, by errors of assumption and the deliberate mis-leadings of 
impression management, it does hopefully indicate something of how one is 
being perceived and assessed more generally. 
Far more anxiety-provoking – presumably because it is more difficult to 
control – is the question of how an unfamiliar group as a whole sees one, a 
group that one confronts without any (inter-subjective) recourse to one 
isolated member. What is in question here is not simply an aggregate of inter-
subjectivity (the sum total of possible one-to-one relationships you may have 
with each member). What is in question is rather an unstable group consensus 
which emerges through the double mediation of what members in the group 
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think not simply of you per se (that is, inter-subjectively) but of what group 
members think other group members think of you more generally (the level of 
the trans-subjective). Importantly, this is not to deny that there may well be an 
aggregate of inter-subjective views – no doubt each single member of a group 
does have a view of you, and this combined force can be significant, one vector 
in the overall trans-subjective consensus. One should not under-estimate the 
degree to which this inter-subjectivity is always mediated by (what is taken to 
be) the group consensus. As ardently as one may stick to one’s subjective 
views, these will always be contextualized, evaluated, made coherent in 
reference to what is thought to be a norm, a bench-mark of value, the 
hypothesized ‘sum total evaluation’ of the subject or object in question. The 
prevailing norm, whether we refer here to it as a discourse, a type of 
hegemony, or a condition of trans-subjectivity, has a different order of agency, 
an agency with the ability to eclipse an amassed inter-subjectivity.  
The canny politician is one who realizes that their destiny depends not 
on the singular subjective opinions of voters, but on the less predictable 
‘collective gestalt’ engendered by public opinion. Such a ‘trans-subjective 
image’ takes on a life of its own, and can never be reduced to the amassed 
(inter)subjectivity of those who make up society. We have cause here to reflect 
on suddenness and unpredictability of change in public opinions. As the 
eponymous character in Stephen Frears’ (2006) film The Queen in effect 
comments to Tony Blair: ‘Your time will come’. That is, enjoy the positive 
regard of the public while it lasts, because this regard may all too abruptly flip 
over into resentment. We can easily enough imagine a situation of a 
constituency in which each member thinks positively of a given political 
candidate – would in fact like to vote for him – but which nonetheless, as a 
whole, votes him or her out of power. The difficulty of gauging such a political 
situation is made apparent by a simple fact: no subjective opinion needs in fact 
to change before a broader trans-subjective tipping-point is reached. What 
matters is not so much what single individuals think, or even the trade in inter-
subjective impressions of the given politician; more important by far is 
apprehension of what the Other of the group thinks (what we might call, with 
a tip of the hat to Lacan, the Other of the others).  
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I have discussed a similar point elsewhere (2011) in reference to racism. 
It is quite possible to find a community where no one - quite honestly - feels 
themselves to be subjectively racist. This may in fact be an accurate 
psychological portrayal of the individuals within this group. Nevertheless such 
a community may well retain deeply racist assumptions embedded either 
within its de-subjectified symbolic and institutional practices or within the 
trans-subjective framework of what others are considered to believe. 
Importantly, this would not necessarily be a case of denial or projection, both 
of which imply the subjective presence of racism which I am suggesting, for the 
purposes of this argument, are absent (i.e. this is not an instance of repressed 
psychological racism). What I am pointing to here is rather a case of distributed 
or delegated racism which can quite adequately persist in ostensibly de-
personalized institutional or trans-subjective forms, without any obvious need 
for clear subjective psychological agents.  
Such a thesis calls to mind Žižek’s (1989) analysis of inter-passivity in 
ideological belief.  Žižek contends that believing often occurs in an extra-
psychological manner via the role of external objects or others. This is the idea, 
in short, that I need not personally believe, for there nonetheless to be a 
believing of which I am part. Thus, in line with the above argument, we might 
contend that I need not be ‘psychologically’ racist, that is, in any way 
subjectively invested in or consciously identified with racist values, for there 
nonetheless to be a racism of which I am a part. One should be attentive to the 
nuance of Žižek’s point, he is not simply eliding the category of subjectivity: the 
believing subject does effectively (indeed, for Žižek, objectively) believe, just 
not in an overtly personalized or subjective manner. They believe instead at 
one step’s remove, with the comfort of cynical distance from their belief. The 
‘believing’ is effectively delegated to a series of institutional operations, 
symbolic actions, or, crucially, to the trans-subjective network of the beliefs of 
others.  
Discursive versus structural positioning  
We can shed further light on the distinction between the (inter)subjective and 
the trans-subjective by referring to an important notion within social 
psychology, that of positioning (Davies & Harré, 2001; Harré & van 
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Langenhove, 1999; Wetherell, 1998), and by contrasting discursive as opposed 
to structural forms of positioning. The influential notion of positioning 
described by Davies & Harré (2001) is “the discursive process whereby selves 
are located in conversations as observably and subjectively coherent 
participants in jointly produced story-lines” (p. 264). Davies & Harré speak of 
positions as “cumulative fragments of a lived autobiography” (p. 265). 
Furthermore: “One way of grasping the concept of positioning as we….use it, is 
to think of someone listening or reading to a story” (p. 265).  
What is immediately apparent is that this notion of positioning is 
contingent upon discourse – it is a discursive practice - and it is content-rich, 
which is to say that it is stories, narratives, conversations, interactional content 
that substantiates or ‘fills out’ the positions in question. Discursive positioning 
is also a sense-making procedure: “We take on the discursive practices and 
story lines as if they were our own and make sense of them” (Davies & Harré, 
2001, p. 271). This type of positioning thus entail an interpretive aspect. It is, 
likewise, a process of negotiation in which subjects respond to different or 
contradictory social demands, weaving together a variety of cultural, social and 
political values available within a number of different discourses.  
Now while initially this account may seem to overlap to some degree 
with the positioning dilemma proposed by Lacan, it is important to stress how 
different the two approaches in fact are. Lacan (1988a, 1988b) is constantly 
wary of subjective meaning as a questionable ego-construction designed to 
substantiate effects of knowledge and stability. He will approach a discourse 
not as a set of thematic or narrative contents, but rather in view of the set of 
relations, in terms of the particular social links, the structural positions 
between people that it holds together (Lacan, 2007). His attention is not drawn 
by the ‘descriptive materials’ of a discourse, i.e. its narratives, meanings, 
stories, etc., but by the relations established between participants, hence his 
(2007) model of four fundamental social bonds (the discourses of the master, 
university, analyst and hysteric) in which the thematic contents may vary 
widely despite that the structural positions remain intact (master and subject; 
doctor and patient; teacher and pupil, etc). Verhaeghe’s (2001) distinction 
between the approaches of Foucault and Lacan is instructive here:  
14 
 
In his discourse theory, Foucault…puts the accent on the content of a 
discourse. Lacan…works beyond the content and places the accent 
on the formal relationships that each discourse draws through the 
act of speaking (p. 21).  
 
Lacan is thus interested in structural positions that are not simply ‘secured’ by 
meaning or by the contents of discursive practices, but which remain in 
question, uncertain, reliant on others’ views which are themselves contingent 
on the presumption of given social norms and values. His attempt is precisely 
to circumvent the psychological (or in his jargon ‘imaginary’) concerns of 
subjective sense-making and meaning by looking to an underlying grid of inter-
linked symbolic positions. These positions are both more precarious and 
opaque than those afforded by subjective attempts at making-meaning. They 
are, furthermore, always linked, as in the prisoner’s dilemma, to other 
positions (indeed, to a chain of interlinked positions). Furthermore, each of 
these related positions remains uncertainly related to a key signifier – in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, the white disk – which remains both conventional (it 
embodies a certain consensus) and yet uncertain (in the pragmatic sense of 
what it may mean here and now). Lacan’s focus on the trans-subjective, 
certainly inasmuch as it prioritizes structural positions and the contingency of 
symbolic values, exists always at a step’s remove from the (inter)subjectivity of 
discursive positioning that focuses on subjective forms of meaning, narrative 
and sense-making. 
 Having drawn such a stark comparison between discursive and structural 
types of positioning – attempting thus to highlight Lacan’s contribution to this 
area of theory – it is worthwhile noting there are a few momentary points of 
resonance between these approaches. As we have seen, Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic perspective emphasizes the contingency of positioning – such 
positions always being linked to, determined by, the position of others – and 
the inherent opacity of such positions. Davies and Harré (2001) come close to 
acknowledging the contingency of such interlinked social relations. Positions, 
they claim, are not merely the result of personal experiences, they are also in 
part the result “of relating to someone in that position” (p. 270). Similarly, the 
sense of continuity we have to being a particular person is…[in part] 
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compounded out of shared interpretations” (p. 271). So, although this factor is 
not stressed by Davies and Harré (2001), it remains nonetheless true that a 
degree of uncertainty shines through the processes of discursive positioning. 
Having noted the role of uncertainty – and by implication, anxiety - in Lacan’s 
approach, let us turn back to his analysis, to appreciate better their importance 
in his account.  
 
Two suspended gestures 
We need now return to our point of departure, for we have not yet exhausted 
all there is to say about the prisoner’s dilemma. As noted above, the second 
period in Lacan’s sequence of logical time, the ‘time for understanding’, varies 
in length because each of the prisoners is reliant in their reasoning upon the 
(in)action of the others. This introduces a problem of course, because this 
inaction - precisely what the logical deduction is dependent upon - will 
evaporate the moment one of the prisoners stands up.  
 The instability of this logical reasoning is compounded by a further 
consideration; the impetus to act first. It is no surprise that Lacan comments 
that ‘the ontological form of anxiety’ manifests at this stage of dilemma. Why 
so? Well, each of the prisoners realizes that their rivals are capable of reaching 
the same conclusion that they have, if they have not in fact already done so. 
The brief triumph accompanying the realization that there is an apparently 
objective solution to the puzzle is thus undercut by the anxious recognition 
that it may be one of the other prisoners who acts first. There is a switch-over 
here between a time of suspension (in which one ensures that one’s fellow 
prisoners are not standing to leave) to the sudden rush to pre-empt the action 
of departure of the others that would then invalidate the basis for one’s own 
conclusion. This is the “temporal pulsation” as Forrester (1990) puts it 
“whereby the time for understanding is transformed into the moment for 
concluding” (p. 181). Or, as Pluth & Hoens (2004) make the point: 
A realizes…that he urgently has to end his thinking process and head 
for the door. So, he jumps to a conclusion that closes the time for 
comprehending, and makes time retroactively meaningful…he can 
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and has to end his thinking by an act. Is A sure of his act? He is sure 
that it is necessary to act, but cannot be sure of the soundness of his 
reasoning. This is the moment [of]…anticipatory certitude….A leaps 
to a conclusion whose ground or reason can only be verified after 
the act (p. 184).  
In other words, the logical solution to the dilemma proposed above is all well 
and good, but it must be reached and acted upon within a context of inter-
subjective reliance. The grounds of this decision may themselves be put in 
question; as in the above reference to what the broader meaning of a given 
meaning might be, we are dealing here with oscillations between ostensible 
objectivity and the attenuated question of what that objectivity might mean. 
We can say then that this scenario represents an intersection of logical and 
psychological considerations. So, if the three prisoners are all of a similar 
intelligence, they will all, when each wearing a white disk, finally arrive at the 
same conclusion: none of the other prisoners is making a move, hence I must 
be wearing a white disk. The delay preceding this point is followed by a 
moment of indecision. If each of the three rises at the same time, how are they 
to interpret the reactions of the other prisoners? The meaning of the actions of 
their fellow prisoners permits for more than one explanation. They will each 
need to ask themselves whether the other prisoners has arrived at the same 
logical conclusion as they have, or whether they stood up simply because they 
saw a black disk. Lacan describes this situation in the following terms: 
If A, seeing B and C set off…wonders again whether they have not in 
fact seen that he is black, it suffices for him to stop and newly pose 
the question… For he sees that they too stop: since each of them is 
really in the same situation as him…each encounters the same doubt 
at the same moment as him. Regardless of the reasoning A now 
imputes to B and C, he will legitimately conclude again that he is 
white. For he posits anew that, had he been a black, B and C would 
have had to continue (pp. 164). 
The awkwardness of the shared indecision does not last long. It is the fact of 
the hesitation which gives the game away: if one of the other prisoners had 
seen a black disk, he would have no reason to stop and question the gestures 
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of his fellow prisoners. The mutual hesitation can only mean that they’re each 
in the exact same position, that each is wearing a white disk. The solution to 
the dilemma relies on a halting sequence – in this respect much like the 
Barbeque sauce problem - whereby inter-subjectivity and trans-subjectivity 
come to be transposed. An initial suspension in which the subject is reliant on 
the actions of their fellow prisoners to stand up or not leads to a logical 
conclusion (‘I am white’), but this is followed by another moment of inter-
subjective hesitation (‘We have all three stood up….why?’) which again gives 
way to a trans-subjective solution (‘None would have hesitated if they saw a 
black disk, thus we are all white’). As Pluth and Hoens (2004) explain: “During 
the halts, what was subjective about the line of reasoning gets de-subjectified, 
and becomes a shared…[trans]subjective truth. Beginning with an uncertain, 
singular decision A reaches a certain and ‘universal’ truth” (p. 184). 
Hastening to identity 
Let us return to the decisive act that the prisoner confronted by two white 
disks in the suspended ‘time of understanding’ is forced to make. This is an act 
which draws a line that commits the prisoner to a course of action. The 
retroactive impact of this act, whose grounds can only be subsequently 
verified, direct us to a discussion of the pre-emptive quality of symbolic 
identifications. It is in respect of such a precipitate gesture in the midst of 
uncertainty – the fact indeed of ‘anticipatory certitude’ – that Lacan makes 
perhaps his chief contribution to the Freudian group psychology that the 
logical time papers seeks to extend. As Žižek (1996) emphasizes in his 
discussion of the paper, symbolic identification – one’s assumption of a given 
social role, of a structural location in a socio-symbolic realm – always maintains 
something of an anticipatory character. Succinctly put: there is a psychological 
time-lag in taking on a symbolic mandate.  Or, as we might convey the same 
point if a different formulation: there is no pre-psychological adaptation to 
what at basis amounts to an anonymous subject-position (‘wife’, ‘brother’, 
‘doctor’, ‘grandmother’) in the symbolic network. One might take as a case in 
point here the ‘rehearsals’ – and I use the word in view of its full theatrical 
significance – of recently married couples, whose repeated reference to the 
nominations “my husband”, “my wife”, form part of their attempt to 
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symbolically ‘play themselves into’ their new roles. This is likewise the case 
when a couple has children, in respect of the time-lag between the child’s 
actually being born (or, perhaps, conceived) and the active assumption of the 
roles which come to be tirelessly repeated - eventually in one no less than the 
child themselves - of “mommy” and “daddy”.  
The fact of (trans-subjective) symbolic performance as condition of 
(subjective) belief can be illustrated via the social rituals that must be obeyed 
in the public lives of people of great historical or political importance. In fact, 
the more illustrious or elevated the symbolic position, the more elaborate the 
performative rituals tend to become, at least historically. We may go back to 
the example of The Queen, which playfully evokes all the odd rules of conduct 
one is expected to abide by when meeting the Monarch: there is no turning of 
one’s back upon or touching of, the Queen; one needs bow or curtsy at the 
right moment, and to use only the correct term of address (“Your Majesty…”), 
etc. It is as if without these seemingly redundant and slightly ridiculous rules of 
conduct we might effectively cease to believe in the elevated social rank in 
question. One might likewise cite the ceremonial activities accompanying the 
inauguration of a new President, along with the title ‘President Elect’ used 
before the event, presumably to prepare the nation for the transition in 
authority. Such symbolic activities need to be performed correctly and to be 
publically witnessed if they are to be registered within the trans-subjective 
network of a given social mass. A recent historical example is of course 
Obama’s ‘second’ swearing-in ceremony, the presidential oath that need to be 
performed a second time.  We might jokingly comment here that given the 
severity of the political contrast between George W Bush and Barack Obama, 
and the fact that Obama was the first African-American president, it was no 
wonder he had to be sworn in twice, to ensure that we would actually believe 
this had happened.  
Back though to the issue of symbolic identification. It is important to 
bear in mind that the structuralist thrust of Lévi-Strauss’s (1974) 
conceptualization of the symbolic – to which Lacan is obviously indebted – 
wants precisely to advance a form of symbolic agency over and above notions 
of subjective agency. One can appreciate how the symbolic order thus 
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conceptualized, is a matrix of spaces, an a-psychological network of relational 
positions. There is no intrinsic psychological essence to these subject-positions, 
no relation of innate belongingness between the subject and their social 
mandate. Much the same point can be made via the clinical psychoanalytic 
cautioning to attend very carefully to moments of sudden symbolic change. 
Indeed, there is something that does not ‘immediately compute’ about sudden 
or dramatic changes in symbolic status which are, not incidentally, often 
considered to be potential triggering-events in the case of psychosis. The who I 
think I am, my experiential and (in Lacanian terminology) imaginary sense of 
identity o the one hand as opposed to what I am called to be, how I am socially 
recognized, my social or symbolic identity, on the other, is always qualified by 
a minimal gap. No hand-to-glove relationship exists between these two facets 
of identity. The reason for this lack of congruence, for the fact that there is no 
spontaneous or natural assumption of symbolic roles – and here I borrow from 
Žižek’s (1996) gloss on Lacanian theory - is that they can always be questioned 
with a ‘…but why me?’ At the level of rational discourse answers can be always 
be provided: ‘I am a prince because my father is the King’. Then again, this 
prince may well remain plagued by the returning question: ‘What is it about 
me that justifies this symbolic destiny?’ The situation is akin to the 
communicative dilemma cited above: ‘Yes, I understand that you have told me 
something, I can interpret the meaning of your words; what eludes me is the 
broader contextual implication of why you’re telling me this now, to what 
further ends? Symbolic roles, in other words, are not groundless; reasons can 
be given for them, it’s just that – offering here a variation on a theme 
introduced above – the grounds for the grounds remain questionable.  
One way of negotiating this gap between imaginary and symbolic 
identifications, of avoiding the unease of this disjuncture, is to vigorously grasp 
one’s symbolic mandate, to pronounce myself as it. I need, in other words, to 
pronounce myself as the role I might be, to declare myself as that and to 
recognize myself as such. What this means is that there is necessarily 
something which precedes the psychological activation of a role, namely the 
symbolic conferral - the declarative event - that provides the symbolic basis to 
make the latter possible. As in the declarations of speech-act theory, we have 
thus an extra-psychological element that forms the basis for imaginary 
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identity. Hence the idea of precipitate identification, the anticipatory, 
hastening character of my symbolic identifications that come prior to their 
actual psychological subjectivization. In his discussion of the “genesis” of 
objective socio-symbolic identity Žižek claims that 
if we simply wait for a symbolic place to be allotted to us, we will 
never live to see it. That is, in the case of a symbolic mandate, we 
never simply ascertain what we are; we “become what we are” by 
means of a precipitous subjective gesture. This precipitous 
identification involves the shift from object to signifier (p. 76). 
In the case of the prisoner’s dilemma, this is the shift from the object of the 
disk – which remains inaccessible to me, an indication that I can have no full 
understanding of what I ‘objectively’ am – to the assumption of the operation 
of the signifier, an understanding that my role is effectively that of what I am in 
the negotiated network of trans-subjective meanings. In order not to be left 
behind in the game, I actively declare myself to be that, the symbolic position 
conferred upon me by the symbolic network (i.e. within the prisoner’s 
dilemma, nominating myself as, and acting accordance with the symbolic 
identity of ‘white’). In so doing  
I assume a symbolic identity which fills out the void of the 
uncertainty as to my being. What accounts for this anticipatory 
overtaking is the inconclusive character of the causal chain… [W]ithin 
the space of symbolic intersubjectivity, I can never simply ascertain 
what I am, which is why my “objective” social identity is established 
by means of “subjective anticipation” (p. 76). 
 
One may think of this as a type of self-interpellation motivated by the anxiety 
of a primary state of non-inclusion. In this way the subject hopes, via a 
peremptory self-inclusion, to deny exclusion, to forestall the possibility of 
social non-belonging. We are presented thus with an instance of symbolic 
subjectivization. It is worth citing the stark ‘syllogism’ with which Lacan closes 
his paper, notable both for blunt formula of human belonging it offers – the 
zero-level, we might speculate, of such a self-nominating declarative event – 
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and for the fact that the first person pronoun (indicative of the fact of 
subjectivization) only appears in the last line: 
 
(1) A man knows what is not a man; 
(2) Men recognize themselves among themselves as men; 
(3) I declare myself as a man for fear of being convinced by men that 
I am not a man (Lacan, 2006b, p. 174). 
 
The ‘grounds of the grounds’ 
By now it is perhaps clear why, in respect of the ‘trans-subjective’, Lacan was 
fascinated with logical time and a puzzle which involves both subjective anxiety 
and a universal solution. Logical time, as Evans (1996) stresses, is neither 
objective (the chronological ‘time of the clock’) nor simply a matter of 
subjective feeling. We are dealing with “a precise dialectical structure”, an 
unfolding sequence of types of inter/trans-subjective logic “based on a tension 
between waiting and haste, between hesitation and urgency” (Evans, p. 206). 
This movement between inter- and trans-subjective logic casts a light on the 
three instances in this paper where I have reflected on paradoxical objectivity, 
be it that of universal logic (the solution of the dilemma), the consensual 
agreed-upon status of certain key signifiers, or the social reality of symbolic 
roles. In each case a form of objectivity is evinced (of logical reasoning, of 
convention, of relations of social exchange) that exceeds the level of subjective 
or inter-subjective interpretation. In each case there is thus a ‘grounds’. 
Importantly however – and this is why Lacan’s work is never simply an 
extension of Levi-Strauss’s structuralism – the grounds in question is subjected 
to the ‘psychological’ articulations of questioning, doubt, anxiety. Hence the 
idea that while there is a stable grounds (rational, consensual, societal 
objectivity) underwriting social life, the ‘ground for the grounds’ can most 
certainly be brought into pragmatic re-consideration. 
 We are better placed thus to understand why Lacanian psychoanalysis 
so often defines itself as being (in a narrow sense) non-psychological. Lacanian 
theory, that is to say, avoids any reduction to the frame of purely psychological 
(inter)subjectivity by prioritizing the role of symbolic functioning, or, more 
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accurately perhaps, by grappling with how the (inter)subjective is always 
profoundly moulded by the trans-subjectivity entailed by such symbolic 
processes. This qualification enables us to anticipate a mis-reading of the ideas 
presented here. True enough, I have attempted in what has gone above to 
stress the difference between the (inter)subjective and the trans-subjective on 
the one hand, and process of psychological/imaginary as opposed to symbolic 
identification on the other. While it is crucial to point out this distinction 
analytically, for each conceptual perspective draws out attention to different 
facets of the social situations being observed, we need to insist on the 
overlapping, inter-penetrating quality of these two aspects of social 
psychological life. As the oscillation between interpretative inter-subjectivity 
and trans-subjectivity in the prisoner’s dilemma makes clear, these two 
dimensions – as is indeed the case for psychological and symbolic modes of 
identification – are coterminous and cannot be divorced from one another. As 
such the analytical challenge lies in grasping this continual relation, the ways in 
which the potential dissonances of this ‘non-fit’ relation are negotiated, in 
closely attending to the oscillations between inter- and trans- subjectivity that 
characterize both the human condition and the more general domain of group 
psychology. 
 The foregoing discussion behind us, we may now return to the question 
of how the respective notions of interobjectivity and the trans-subjective 
intersect. A clear point of commonality is apparent: both ideas point to a level 
of analysis beyond the confines of (inter)subjectivity, to a type of objectivity 
that may play its part if co-ordinating human relations and understanding. In 
what has gone above I have discussed the time-lag between symbolic roles and 
psychological identifications. I have likewise touched on the idea of the 
symbolic as an a-psychological network of relational positions. In doing so, I 
tried to emphasize the importance of various declarative gestures and 
symbolic rituals in holding identities in place, as conditions of possibility for 
psychological/imaginary identifications. The upshot here is that some matrix of 
common beliefs or understandings, some external framework of mediation 
becomes absolutely essential in human sociality. The same point is made by 
theorists of interobjectivity. Recall Moghaddam’s (2003) description of in-
group interobjectivity as an account of the nature of shared meanings for 
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people within the same cultural context that relies on a form of ‘objectivity’. In 
this respect the notions of the trans-subjective and interobjectivity are in full 
agreement.  
The difference comes with how the ‘objectivity’ in question is 
understood. The ‘objectivity’ in the Lacanian account I have introduced here is 
always symbolic, always to be understood in reference to the role of language, 
or, in Lacanian jargon ‘the operation of the signifier’ in the production of a 
symbolic universe. It pays in this respect to return to Žižek’s careful 
qualification that precipitous identification “involves the shift from object to 
signifier” (1996, p. 76). We might put it this way: an object is never merely an 
object within human relations, but an element in a distributed and never fully-
resolved signifying game. A Lacanian perspective would therefore want to 
stress that whatever serves as the object in a given instance of interobjectivity 
is also a signifier, a signifier, furthermore, which represents something not 
merely to one or two others, but – as I have tried to show above - to the Other 
of these others.  It is this facet of the Lacanian account, a questioning of what 
the (trans-subjective) Other of various (inter-subjective) others wants, that 
emphasizes something not stressed by theorists of interobjectivity, namely 
that the objectivity in question is shadowed by a degree of uncertainty, by a 
minimal residual anxiety. After all, it is never exactly sure what this Other of 
others – understood here as exactly a conjunction of the symbolic and 
subjective - in fact wants.  
This insistence on object as signifier poses a challenge to those theories 
of inter-objectivity which focus on material object-relations to the relative 
exclusion of symbolic considerations. It helps to return here to the distinction 
offered at the beginning of the paper between a) inter-objectivity as a 
description of material object-relations, and b) interobjectivity as a description 
of a representation that spans different objectifications and enables diverse 
inter-objective relations (Sammut, Daanen & Sartawi, 2010, p. 451). To be 
clear: there is a general agreement between the approach of trans-subjectivity 
discussed above and the second approach to interobjectivity as described by 
Sammut et al, an approach which after all, is sensitive to the role of 
representations and aligned symbolic considerations. The problem lies with the 
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what we might provisionally term ‘non-symbolic’ notions of interobjectivity. I 
have in mind here particularly Latour’s (1996) influential discussion of this 
notion, which explores how the affordances of various objects both condition 
and structure relationships between actors in a way which effectively bypasses 
broader symbolic considerations.  Latour (1996) makes reference to the 
organized behaviour of simian societies, explicitly thus seeking to avoid any 
recourse to the ‘role of the signifier’, to any structuring function of the 
symbolic, which he feels are frequently inadequate and over-used theoretical 
notions. Now while it is too late to enter into any detailed consideration of this 
seminal paper, to enlarge upon the disagreements and convergences that may 
emerge in light of the material discussed above, it perhaps suffices for me to 
close with a question. The Lacanian approach warns that objects in a world of 
meaning cannot be severed from signifiers; within the social domain there are 
never merely material objects (or affordances) separated off from the 
dimension of what they might be thought to mean for others. This suggests 
that the role of signifier is apparent even where we might not expect to find it, 
even within - to draw on Latour’s (1996) example - the social negotiations of 
simian actors. The question is this: can the distinction between ‘non-symbolic’ 
and symbolic interobjectivity be considered tenable, if interobjectivity always – 
seemingly necessarily - entails a minimal degree of signification? We should, in 
short, be cautious of assuming that inter-objectivity, in Latour’s sense of ‘the 
materiality of object-relations’ ever exceeds the question of signification. 
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